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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MARION H. WEBB and JILL W.
BROWN,

:

Plaintiffs/Respondents,
vs.

Case No 880137

VANTAGE INCOME PROPERTIES,
BRUCE HONEY, and STEVE
HOLCOMB,

:

Priority Classification
No. 14(b)

Defendants/Appellants.

APPELLANTS1 BRIEF
JURISDICTION
The Court's Jurisdiction over this appeal arises from Utah
Constitution Article VIII, § 3, Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(j)
(1953, as amended) and Rule 3, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from an order granting default judgment in
favor of Respondents Marian H. Webb and Jill W. Brown and against
Appellants Vantage Income Properties, Bruce Honey and Steve
Holcomb under Respondents' First Cause of Action alleging violations
of the Utah Racketeering Influences and Criminal Enterprise Act
("RICE"), under §§ 76-10-1602(p),(q), and (s) of the act as was in
effect at the time of the complaint.

Default judgment was entered

in favor of Respondents upon Defendants1 refusal to produce
-1-

certain documents, claiming privilege against self-incrimination
under the Constitution of Utah and the United States Constitution.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did Appellants properly assert their privilege against

self-incrimination by refusing to provide sales records and
customer lists to Respondents who sought such information for the
expressed purpose of establishing a pattern of racketeering
activity on the part of Appellants?
2.

Did Appellant Holcomb waive his right to claim privilege

against self-incrimination by making certain non-incriminating
statements?
3.

May a Plaintiff sustain an action for civil remedies

under the criminal RICE statute without first alleging specific
actions of a Defendant in the Complaint that would warrant an
indictment if presented to a grand jury?
4.

Should the Appellants be awarded costs and attorneyfs

fees for this appeal which has been brought to protect their
constitutional right against self-incrimination?

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The constitutional provisions relevant to the determination
of this case, copies of which are attached hereunder as Exhibit
"A" to the Addendum, are as follows:
1.

Constitution of Utah, Article I, § 12.

2.

Constitution of the United States, Amendment V.
-2-

3.

Utah Code Annotated, §§ 76-10-1602(p),(q), and (s)
(1953, as amended) as in effect at the time of the Complaint.

4.

Utah Code Annotated, §76-10-1801 et sea. (1953, as amended)

5.

Utah Code Annotated, § 77-11-5 (1953, as amended).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of the Case,

This is an appeal from an order

granting default judgment in favor of Respondents against Appellants
by reason of Appellants refusal to produce documents in a civil action
brought under the Utah Racketeering Influences and Criminal
Enterprise Act ("RICE") as it was in effect at the time the alleged
violations occurred.

Although the action was civil, the statue is

a criminal statute that provides civil remedies if the Plaintiff
is successful in proving that Defendant violated the criminal
provisions of the statute.
2.

Course of Proceedings.

During the discover phase of the

case in early 1987, Appellants in this action refused to provide
certain documents requested by Respondents for the expressed
purpose of proving that Appellants had committed crimes under the
statute.

Appellants claimed privilege against self-incrimination

under the Constitution of Utah and the Constitution of the United
States.

In October 1987, Respondents brought a motion to compel

and for sanctions against Appellants.

Appellants restated their

claim of privilege against self-incrimination, and in December
1987 the matter was again brought before the Trial Court, which
ordered that if the documents were not produced, default judgment
would be entered against the Appellants.

In late December 1987,

Appellants attempted to obtain permission to appeal the interlocutory
order of Trial Court.

Permission was refused, and Appellants

informed the Trial Court that they would not waive their right to
claim privilege against self-incrimination and refused to produce
the documents sought by Respondent.
3.

Disposition at Trial Court.

The Trial Court below ruled

against Appellants' assertion of privilege againsc self-incrimination
and entered default judgment against Appellants Honey and Vantage
Income Properties on March 28, 1988, and against Appellant Holcomb
on September 27, 1988 in the amount of $141,232.65.

RELEVANT FACTS
Respondents commenced an action against Appellants on February
21, 1986 for fraud and racketeering based on a real estate transaction
that had taken place the previous summer wherein Respondents had
purchased an apartment complex located at 576-604 Vine Street in
Murray, Utah (Record, Pages 2-10).

Appellants had represented

Respondents as their real estate broker in the transaction.

As a

basis for racketeering, Respondents alleged actions and omissions
of Appellants that constituted communications fraud, as set forth
in § 76-10-1801 et seq. of the Utah Code Annotated, and the
consummation of an alleged fraudulent real estate sale in violation
of the Utah Racketeering Influences and Criminal Enterprise Act
("RICE") under §§ 76-10-1602(p),(q), and (s) of the act as was in
effect at the time of the complaint (Record, Pages 8-10).

A

statutory prerequisite for a racketeering cause of action under
-4-

RICE was the establishment of a pattern of racketeering activity,
defined under § 76-10-1602(4) as:
. . . at least two episodes of racketeering conduct
which have the same or similar objectives, results, participants, victims or methods of commission, or are otherwise
interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not
isolated events, provided at least one of the episodes
occurred after the effective date of this part and the last
of which occurred within five years after the commission of
a prior episode of racketeering conduct.
On April 8, 1987, after a motion to compel had been granted
to Respondents (Record, Page 89), Appellants responded to specific
requests by Respondents for the production of documents, which
included customer sales records of Vantage Income Properties and
customer lists of Defendant Steve Holcomb, by refusing to produce
such documents, claiming privilege against self-incrimination
(Record, Pages 135-138).
On October 5, 1987, Respondents brought a motion to strike
Appellants answers and enter default by reason of Appellants1
failure to produce the documents (Record, Pages 101-115).

Appellants

argued at the hearing that the only fact that could be proven
from such documents was a pattern of racketeering based on previous
real estate transactions (Record, Page 122). Accordingly, they
argued, such testimony would be incriminating because it would
establish that Appellants had indeed committed a crime.
Respondents asserted on page 5 of their memorandum in support
of the October 5th motion that the information was needed to
assist in the preparation of Respondents1 case of fraud and racketeering (Record, Page 107). At the hearing, Mr. Newton, counsel
for Respondents, argued that Respondents were seeking others who
-5-

might have similar claims against the Appellants to support their
allegations of a pattern of racketeering and thus assist Respondents
efforts to get Mr. Holcomb "off of the streets'1 (Record, Page
180) .
the Court ruled that the answers provided in the responses to
Respondents' request for production of documents that were delivered
to Respondents on April 8, 1987 were inadequate under the Rules of
Civil Procedure, and further, did not state sufficiently the
grounds upon which Appellants claimed a privilege against selfincrimination (Record, Pages 134, 139-141).

The Court ordered

Appellants to file supplementary responses within 10 days.
Supplemental responses were filed by Appellants on October 14,
1987 that conformed with the Rules of Civil Procedure and provided
a more detailed basis of Appellants' claims for 5th amendment
protection (Addendum, Exhibit " B " ) .

Responding therein to the

specific request for sales records and customer lists, Appellants
stated the following:
Defendants object to producing such information and/or
documents, and invoke their 5th amendment privilege
against self-incrimination for the following reasons.
Plaintiffs have stated repeatedly, in their oral arguments
before this Court on April 8, 1987, in their Memorandum
in Support of Striking Defendants' Answer on file
herein, and in their oral argument before this Court on
October 5, 1987, that the expressed purpose of obtaining
information under this request is to discover information
that will support their claims under the First Cause of
Action in the Complaint herein against Defendants for
alleged violations of the Utah Racketeering Influences
and Criminal Enterprise Act ("RICE") specifically
enumerated in §§ 76-10-1602(p),(q) and (s).
The specific provisions allegedly violated by
Defendants, as set forth in the First Cause of Action
in the Complaint herein, constitute a second degree
-6-

felony in the State of Utah. §§ 76-10-1602 and 76-101603 state that a "pattern of racketeering activity"
must be proved to establish liability. Plaintiffs
further assert in their First, Second and Fourth Causes
of Action that Defendants have committed acts or omissions
that would constitute criminal violations of the Communications Fraud statute found at § 76-10-1801 of the
Criminal Code which would also constitute a second
degree felony.
Plaintiffs seek to support their allegations of
racketeering in the Complaint herein by "fishing"
through the sales records and customers of Steve Holcomb
in an attempt to find anyone who might join in Plaintiffs'
criminal allegations and thus establish a "pattern of
racketeering activity." This was expressly represented
by Paul Newton, counsel for Plaintiffs at the hearing
on October 5, 1987, who stated substantially, or words
to the effect, that Plaintiffs wanted to find other
customers who were no longer "loyal" to Mr. Holcomb,
and assist Plaintiffs in their efforts to "get him off
the streets."
If Defendants are required to produce such documents,
and, if Plaintiffs are successful in establishing
sufficient evidence from such records that Defendants
have indeed violated provisions of RICE and thus committed
a second degree felony, then such violations shall have
been established through their own testimony, in direct
conflict with their expressed desire and constitutional
privilege not to provide any testimony that would tend
to incriminate themselves.
It is well established
that Plaintiffs have a burden of establishing such
criminal liability on the face of their complaint in
order to obtain the treble damages they seek as civil
relief under §76-10-1605. If Plaintiffs have carried
their burden, there is no need for further supportive
discovery. If they have not plead violations of RICE
sufficient to establish liability under RICE, which in
this case is clear they have not, then they cannot
force Defendants, in violation of their 5th amendment
rights, to provide information that could be used in
any way to establish such liability and prove that
Defendants had indeed committed a second degree felony.
Plaintiffs assert that Defendant Holcomb has
previously waived his 5th amendment rights in testimony
found on pages 48, 54, 59, 60, and 84-88 of Mr. Holcomb1s
deposition of December 4, 1986, which deposition remains
unpublished in this action. Defendants assert that
Defendant Holcomb has made no representation whatsoever
on those pages, or at any other part of said deposition
-7-

that he has committed any act that can be construed as
a criminal violation of RICE or any other criminal
statute that would constitute a waiver of his 5th
amendment rights, nor has he testified to any matter
therein that can only be verified or established by a
review of the sales records of Vantage Income Properties
or customer lists of Steve Holcomb.
Mr. Newton argued before the Court on October 5,
1987 that Mr. Holcomb had testified that there were
numerous times that he had to take property back,
implying to the Court that Mr. Holcomb had committed
alleged criminal acts. As clearly stated on the pages
referred to by Plaintiffs' counsel in the deposition,
each decision by Mr. Holcomb to take property back was
based on a business judgment that served the interests
of all parties concerned, and in no instance were the
Defendants ever compelled to take back such properties.
In summary, Defendants object to providing information
in the sales records or from Mr. Holcombfs list of
customers on the basis that any information found by
Plaintiffs in such records and lists that could support
their expressed goal of proving their allegations of
criminal violations by Defendants, and establish a
pattern of racketeering, or any other provision of the
RICE or Communications Fraud statutes, would accordingly
be incriminating, and consequently Defendants invoke
their 5th amendment right not to testify in any manner
against themselves. This objection is supported by
Defendants1 Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs1
Motion to Strike Defendants1 Answer which was previously
filed in this matter and argued before the Court on
October 5, 1987, which memorandum is incorporated
herein by reference.
On October 29, 1987, Respondents filed another motion for
sanctions against Appellants on the basis that the Appellants had
filed a response that did nothing more than "reiterate their
prior arguments concerning their privilege against self incrimination.
They have provided this court with no more information than they
previously have provided concerning how this information might
incriminate them" (Record, Page 142-154).
The matter was argued on December 7, 1987.
-8-

The Court ruled

that (1) Defendant Steve Holcomb had made a waiver of his 5th
amendment privilege in a deposition by stating, "Our company was
very proud of the fact that in the hundreds of apartment houses
that we sold, we had very few people that were dissatisfied with
the service we had performed," and (2) that the Appellants could
not assert the Fifth Amendment as and objection and privilege to
Respondents1 request for production of documents when Appellants
had "failed to show and would not represent that there is anything
contained within such documents that is incriminating" (Record,
Page 196-198).
On December 24, 1987, Appellants filed a Petition for Permission
to Appeal Interlocutory Order with the Utah Supreme Court in an
attempt to have the matter of privilege against self-incrimination
reviewed before Appellants would have to choose between incurring
the sanctions of the court by refusing to comply with its order,
or irrevocably waiving their rights by providing the information.
In early January, 1988 the Utah Supreme Court denied Appellants'
petition, and pursuant to an order made by the District Court on
January 4, 1988, Appellants gave notice to Respondents of their
intent not to produce the documents requested by Respondents and
thereby waive Appellants1 claim of privilege against self-incrimination (Record, Page 212). On February 1, 1988, upon motion by
Respondents, the Court struck Appellants' answers to Respondents'
First Cause of Action, entered Default Judgment against Appellants
in favor of Respondents, certified his order for appeal under
Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and stayed
-9-

proceedings on the remaining causes of action pending the outcome
of the appeal (Record, Page 217 and 251),

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah provide that no
person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

The

privilege may be invoked if an answer might incriminate and there
is some possibility that a criminal action might be filed; [Rogers
v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 374-75 (1951)], even though no
criminal charges are pending [Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S.
547, 562 (1892)].

The privilege against self-incrimination was

extended to the production of documents in the landmark case of
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), and has since been
held to require the elements of (1) compulsion (2) of a testimonial
communication, and that (3) the communication could be incriminating,
such that it could furnish "a link in the chain of evidence" that
could be used to prosecute the individual invoking the privilege,
[United States v. Hoffman, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1951)]
The order of trial court required Appellants to produce
documents that may have incriminated them, in spite of their
continuous, and good faith efforts to inform the Trial Court of
the danger of self-incrimination.

The order to produce the sales

records and customer lists over Appellants privilege against
self-incrimination was patently unconstitutional.
Trial Court also erred in its ruling that Appellant Holcomb
-10-

waived his right to claim privilege against self-incrimination by
making statements that are obviously not incriminating in and of
themselves.
Finally, Respondents should not be allowed to recover, even
by a default judgment, under complaint allegations that on their
face do not sufficiently state a cause of action under the statutory
requirements for racketeering; nor should Appellants incur the
cost of judgment and this appeal as a price to pay for their
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.
ARGUMENT
POINT NO. 1: APPELLANTS HAVE PROPERLY ASSERTED THEIR
CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
IN REFUSING TO PRODUCE CERTAIN DOCUMENTS AND THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN ENTERING DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST APPELLANTS,
The basis for privilege against self-incrimination is found
in Article I Section 12 of the Utah Constitution and in the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.

The United States

Supreme Court has interpreted the privilege against self-incrimination
in numerous cases, many of which apply directly to the issues
raised in this appeal.
To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from
the implications of the question, [emphasis added] in the
setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to
the question, or an explanation of why it cannot be answered
might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result,
rHoffman, at 486-87]
The Court further stated in Hoffman that an individual
claiming such privilege need not give a detailed explanation of
why the privilege is invoked, because such disclosure in and of
itself could be incriminating.
-11-

. . . if the witness, upon interposing his claim were
required to prove the hazard in the sense in which a
claim is usually required to be established in court,
he would be compelled to surrender the very protection
which the privilege is designed to guarantee. [.Id. at 486]
In the case at bar, the implications of the question are
simple, and have been restated by Respondents on numerous occasions;
they want to find information to support a pattern of racketeering
on the part of Appellants by perusing the customer lists of
Appellant Steve Holcomb and the business records of Vantage
Income Properties, even though such information bears no relevance
whatsoever to the specific, expressed allegations set forth in
Plaintiffs' Complaint [emphasis added].

The only value of such

information, is to provide collateral proof that Appellants have
engaged in a "pattern of racketeering" and in doing so, have
violated the criminal provisions of RICE.
IF Appellants had produced such documents, and jCF Respondents
had successfully found information sufficient to support their
allegations of a "pattern of racketeering", then the establishment
of that fact would have come from Appellants own testimony by
providing Respondents with incriminating evidence to show that
indeed, they had committed crimes and were liable to Respondents.
Both parties to this appeal have relied on a Utah case,
First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Salt Lake City v.
Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257, 1267 (Utah, 1984) which cited a federal
case, Davis v. Fendier, 650 F.2d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 1981)
stating that in order to assert a 5th amendment privilege, it
requires at a minimum, a good faith effort to provide the trial
-12-

judge with sufficient information from which he can make an
intelligent evaluation of the claim.

This point of law was

stated in Schamanek to contrast the conduct of the Defendant Gail
Schamanek, who had been sued by First Federal Savings and Loan
over a cashier's check that was allegedly cashed, and then retrieved
by the defendant when the teller's attention was diverted.

In that

case, the defendant made no effort whatsoever to explain the
basis of her 5th amendment claim of privilege, and refused to
comply with an order of the Court demanding that she submit to
discovery.

The Utah Supreme Court provided a complete synopsis

of all the 5th amendment holdings that could have protected Ms.
Schamanek, had she only made a good faith effort to tell the
Court why the information requested could have incriminated her.
She made no effort, and consequently her answer was stricken.
In this case, Appellants had clearly, and repeatedly asserted
that the specific information sought by Respondents for the expressed
purpose of establishing a pattern of racketeering, if provided by
Respondents, could incriminate themselves as having committed
crimes under RICE.

Appellants claims were not, as argued by

Respondents, a simple rendition of legal arguments explaining a
theoretical reason why they should not have to comply with Respondents1 discovery requests.

It was a clear and convincing fact

that if Respondents were able to find information that established
a pattern of racketeering from the customer lists of Appellant
Steve Hoicomb and the business records of Vantage Income Properties
provided to Respondents by Appellants, then Appellants would have
-13-

in fact testified against themselves and established criminal
liability, in direct conflict with their constitutional rights
against self-incrimination.
Respondents argued repeatedly that in order for Appellants
to claim privilege against self-incrimination, they had to follow
some ill-defined process of an "explanation of what criminal
conduct might be charged and how the documents sought would
provide a link in the chain to establishing such criminal charges."
The U.S. Supreme Court stated in Hoffman:
. . . if the witness, upon interposing his claim,
were required to prove the hazard in the sense in which
a claim is usually required to be established in court,
he would be compelled to surrender the very protection
which the privilege is designed to guarantee. [Id. at 486]
Even though the standard set in Hoffman did not require the
criteria sought by Respondents, Appellants, in their response of
October 14, 1987 set forth hereinabove, exceeded the requirements
by providing a complete and detailed analysis of the threat of
incrimination they were facing, far beyond what would have constituted
good faith compliance with the Hoffman rule.
The basis for Appellants1 objections to Respondents1 discovery
requests and their ensuing claim of privilege against self-incrimination as provided to the Trial Court on October 14, 1987 set
forth hereinabove, go far beyond the standards set by this Court
and the United States Supreme Court for a valid assertion of such
privilege, and accordingly, the Trial Court erred in granting
default judgment in favor of Respondents.

-14-

POINT NO. II; NONE OF THE TESTIMONY GIVEN BY APPELLANT HOLCOMB
IN HIS DEPOSITION, OR OTHERWISE, IN THE CASE BELOW CONSTITUTED
A WAIVER OF HIS PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION.
Addressing the issue of statements that constitute a waiver
of the privilege against self-incrimination, the U.S. Supreme
Court has stated in order for the fact so disclosed to constitute
a waiver, the disclosed fact itself must be incriminating.
[Rogers, at 373].

In a related case, In Re Corrugated Container

Anti-Trust Litigation, 661 F.2d 1145, 1158 (7th Cir. 1981), the
7th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that even testimony previously
given under protection of immunity did not constitute a waiver in
subsequent "unprotected" actions.

More importantly, however, the

Court clearly enunciated the crux of self-incrimination issues in
civil cases:
Any inconvenience to the plaintiffs must pale in
the face of denial of the fundamental right against selfincrimination.
In sum we are asked to rely on too many uncertainties.
Plaintiffs assure us that Conboy will not be prosecuted.
But Conboy might be prosecuted. Plaintiffs assure us that
the deposition testimony could never be used against Conboy.
But that testimony might be used against him. And when he
does testify, he might face the possibility of perjury or
waiver.
In the face of these uncertainties, we should not
conclude that Conboy1s Fifth Amendment protections do
not apply. [Id. at 1159, emphasis added] [See also:
Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950)]
In two related cases, Arndstein v. McCarthy, United Sates
Marshall for the Southern District of New York, 254 U.S. 71
(1920) and McCarthy, United States Marshall for the Southern
District of New York v. Arndstein, 262 U.S. 355 (1923), the U.S.
Supreme Court stated:
-15-

. . . that since the evidence furnished "did not
amount to an admission of guilt or furnish clear proof
of a crime . . . the privilege had not been abandoned
and the witness was entitled to stop short when further
testimony might tend to incriminate him. [emphasis added]
[see also Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148 (1957)]
In the case at bar, no rational interpretation of any statement
made by Appellant Holcomb during his deposition can be construed
in the most liberal of interpretations to constitute "an admission
of guilt or furnish clear proof of a crime."

In order for the above

referenced statement to be construed as a waiver of Appellant
Holcombfs privilege against self-incrimination, It must be shown
that the statement relied upon as the basis of such waiver constituted
an incriminating statement in and of itself, and that such waiver
was knowingly and intentionally waived. [See Johnson v. Zerbst,
Warden, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).

Accordingly the trial court's

finding that Appellant Holcomb has waived his privilege against selfincrimination is in error, and his constitutionally protected
privilege against self-incrimination must be preserved.
POINT NO. Ill: RSSPONDENTS SHOULD NOT BS ALLOWED TO PREVAIL IN
AN ACTION BY DEFAULT OR OTHERWISE WHERE THE COMPLAINT FAILED
TO PROPERLY SET FORTH SUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO STATE A CAUSE
OF ACTION FOR RACKETEERING AND WHERE THE PRIVILEGED INFORMATION
SOUGHT FROM APPELLANTS WAS INTENDED TO CURE SUCH FLAW.
A recent holding in Federal District Court for the District
of Utah written by Judge Jenkins focused on the burden to be met
by plaintiffs bringing RICO and RICE actions in the state of
Utah.

Addressing the need for courts to control overenthusiastic

use of RICO and RICE Judge Jenkins wrote:
A private civil action under RICO is grounded on
the premise that a party has twice engaged in "racketeering
activity". The Act defines "racketeering activity" as
-16-

behavior "indictable" [emphasis added] under specific
provisions of the United States Code. . . possible only
if the factual basis of those" acts of racketeering" is
set out with particularity. [Bache Halsey Stuart Shields
Incorporated v. Tracy Collins Bank & Trust Company,
558 F.Supp. 1042, 1045 (D. Utah, 1983)]
Judge Jenkins further pointed out that to properly plead a
cause of action for RICO, an offense was not "indictable" [emphasis
added] merely because it is alleged; it must be "well founded"
and based on probable cause, [Id. citing Brazburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 668, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 2660, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972)] and
must include a factual statement similar to a bill of particulars
in a criminal action. [Id. at 1046].
Judge Jenkins contrasts the Utah RICE statute by stating:
Rather than requiring the acts be "indictable",
the Utah definition requires that the act be "illegal
under the laws of Utah". Like the Federal Act, however,
the Utah Racketeering Act suggests that the predicate
crimes must be alleged with particularity. The court
can determine whether the pleadings state a violation of
the Utah Act only if the facts are sufficient to show that
the alleged activity would be illegal in Utah and would
fall into one of the enumerated categories.
The statute is silent on the standard to be used
in deciding if the alleged activity is illegal. However,
even if the determination only requires a finding that
the facts would be indictable, the burden is greater
than under the federal statute. [Id. at 1047, emphasis
added]
The basis for applying a stricter standard under RICE than
is found under RICO is explained as follows:
In many states the grand jury is directed to indict
if it finds "probable cause" to believe that the accused
has committed a crime . . . In others, however, it is
directed to indict "when all the evidence taken together,
if unexplained or uncontradicted, would warrant the
conviction of a defendant." . . . Since the trial jury
would convict only if convinced of the accusedfs guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt [emphasis added], it generally
-17-

is assumed that this "prima facie case" standard imposes
a substantially more rigorous test than the traditional
"probable cause11 test. [Id. at 1048 citing Y. Kamisar,
W. LaFave & J. Israel, Modern Criminal Procedure,1025-26
n.9 (5th ed. 1980)]
Judge Jenkins concludes the analysis by pointing out that
Utah has adopted the more demanding of these standards.

As set

forth in § 77-19-5 of the Utah Code Annotated at the time of the
Complaint (now found at § 77-11-5):
It is the duty of a grand jury to find an indictment
when all the evidence before them, taken as a whole,
would in their judgment justify a conviction by jury trial.
In the case at bar, considering the racketeering allegations
of Respondents, set forth in their Complaint, even in their best
light, are insufficient to meet either a "prima facie case"
standard, or a probable cause standard.
As stated repeatedly by Respondents, the purpose for obtaining
the sales record and customer list information, claimed by Appellants
to be privileged, was to establish the necessary pattern of
racketeering activity that would prove Appellants had committed
the crime as alleged and accordingly facilitate Respondents1
civil damages recovery.

In essence, by refusing to testify

against themselves, Appellants incurred a default judgment under
a Complaint that was fatally flawed at the outset in its failure
to state a racketeering cause of action.

Clearly, Respondents

should not benefit both from the denial of Appellants constitutional
rights against self-incrimination and a the award of a default
under a complaint that patently fails to meet the statutory
requirements for a violation that would allow recovery for civil
-18-

damages.
POINT IV: APPELLANTS SHOULD 3S AWARDED COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES
HEREIN BECAUSE THEIR CLAIM OF FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE
HAS BEEN VALIDLY ASSERTED IN LIEU OF PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS.
It has been well established by the U.S. Supreme Court, that
a witness cannot be penalized for asserting a fifth amendment
privilege.

In Spevac v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1966) the Court

reasserted its possession that:
The Fourteenth Amendment secures against state
invasion the same privilege that the Fifth Amendment
guarantees against federal infringement—the right of
a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak
in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to
suffer no penalty . . . for such silence. [Id. at 514]
In this context "penalty" is not restricted to
fine or imprisonment. It means, as we said in Griffin
v. California, 380 U.S. 609, the imposition of any
sanction which makes assertion of the Fifth Amendment
privilege "costly." [Id. at 515]
In the case at bar, Appellants have suffered substantial
cost for the assertion of their privilege against self-incrimination,
including both the judgment entered against them, and the costs
incurred on this appeal.

Accordingly, Appellants should be

awarded attorney's fees based upon the affidavit of counsel
attached hereunder as Exhibit "C" to the Addendum.
CONCLUSIONS
The basis for Appellants1 objections to Respondents1 discovery
requests and their ensuing claim of privilege against self-incrimination as provided to the Trial Court on October 14, 1987 set
forth hereinabove, go far beyond the standards set by this Court
and the United States Supreme Court for a valid assertion of such
privilege, and accordingly, the Trial Court erred in granting
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default judgment in favor of Respondents.

Further, the Trial

Court erred in its finding that statements made by Appellant
Steve Holcomb at a deposition in this matter constituted a waiver
of privilege against self incrimination, because such statements
were not, in and of themselves, incriminating,
Appellants have also argued herein that Respondents should
not be allowed to take a default judgment against Appellants,
even if their answers are stricken, because the complaint on its
face fails to properly allege a valid pattern of unlawful activity
as required for a racketeering cause of action.

Respondents were

well aware of the defect in their pleading, and were attempting
to cure the problem by forcing Appellants to testify against
themselves to establish such a pattern.
Finally, Appellants have incurred substantial cost and
penalties against them during the course of their claiming constitutional rights against self-incrimination.

By reason of well

established rulings prohibiting such costs and penalties, Respondentsf
judgment should be vacated and Appellants should be awarded costs
and attorneyfs fees incurred in this Appeal.
Appellants pray that the Trial Court below be reversed and
the judgment herein vacated; and further, that Appellants be
awarded costs and attorneys fees incurred in this appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7th day of March, 1989.

MICHAEL S. ELDRSDGE
Attorney for Appellants
-20-
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Certificate of Delivery
I hereby certify that I caused to be delivered 4 true and
correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondent to James L.
Christensen, Esq. and Paul D. Newton, Esq. of CORBRIDGE, BAIRD &
CHRISTENSEN, attorneys for Respondents, at 215 South State Street,
Suite 800, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this 7th day of March, 1989.

MICHAEL S. ELDREOGE
Attorney for Appellants
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ADDENDUM
Exhibit "A" - Statutory Provisions
The Constitution of the United States, Amendment V, reads as follows:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in
the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.
Constitution of Utah, Article I, § 12, reads as follows:
Sec. 12.

[Rights of accused persons.]

In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof,
to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses
against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance
of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by
an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense
is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all
cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the
rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Utah Code Annotated, § 77-11-5 (1953, as amended), reads as follows:
77-11-5. Duty to find indictments on sufficient showing. It is
the duty of the grand jury to find an indictment when all the
evidence before them, taken as a whole, would in their judgment
justify a conviction by a jury trial.
Utah Code Annotated, § 76-10-1601 et seq. (1953, as amended), and
§ 76-10-1801 et seq. (1953, as amended) as of the time of filing
the Complaint in the action below, are attached hereto.
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76-10-1509

of the owner of the property or the bus company, or its duly authorized representative is guilty of theft and shall be punished pursuant to section 76-6-412.
History: L. 1979, ch. 72, § 8.
76-10-1509. Obstructing operation of bus. Any person who unlawfully
obstructs or impedes by force or violence, or any means of intimidation, the regular
operation of a bus is guilty of a class C misdemeanor.
History: L. 1979, ch. 72, § 9.
76-10-1510. Obstructing operation of bus — Conspiracy. Two or more persons who willfully or maliciously combine or conspire to violate section 76-10-1509
shall each be guilty of a class C misdemeanor.
History: L. 1979, ch. 72, § 10.
76-10-1511. Cumulative and supplemental nature of act. The provisions of
this act shall be cumulative and supplemental to the provisions of any other law
of the state.
History: L. 1979, ch. 72, § 11.
PART 16
RACKETEERING ENTERPRISES
Section
76-10-1601.
76-10-1602.
76-10-1603.
76-10-1604.
76-10-1605.

Short title.
Definitions.
Unlawful acts — Felony — Forfeitures.
Enforcement authority of peace officers.
Remedies of person injured by pattern of racketeering activity
orders of district court.
76-10-1606. Payments to general fund of state.
76-10-1607. Evidentiary value of criminal judgment in civil proceeding.
76-10-1608. Separability clause.

Authorized

76-10-1601. Short title. This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah
Racketeering Influences and Criminal Enterprise Act."
History: C. 1953, 76-10-1601, enacted by
L. 1981, ch. 94, § 1.
Title of Act.
An act relating to organized fraudulent
and illegal enterprise crime; designating the
following activities as unlawful: to use or
invest proceeds from a pattern of
racketeering conduct in an enterprise; to
acquire or maintain an interest in, or to conduct an enterprise through a pattern of

racketeering conduct; or to conspire to
engage in such conduct; providing criminal
penalties; providing for enforcement; providing civil and equitable remedies; providing
for the rights of innocent persons; and providing that any aggrieved person may institute civil proceedings to seek damages; and
providing an effective date.
This act enacts part 16, chapter 10, Title
76, Utah Code Annotated 1953. - Laws 1981,
ch. 94.

76-10-1602. Definitions. As used in this part:
(1) "Racketeering" means any act committed for financial gain which is illegal
under the laws of Utah regardless of whether such act is in fact charged or
indicted, involving:
/~\
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(c) Aggravated kidnapping or kidnapping;
(d) Forgery;
(e) Aggravated burglary or burglary;
(f) Asserting false claims including, but not limited to, false claims asserted
through fraud, arson, unlawful public assistance, or Medicaid fraud;
(g) Theft, including theft by deception, theft by extortion, theft of lost, mislaid
or mistakenly delivered property, receiving stolen property, theft of services and
theft by any person having custody of property pursuant to repair or rental agreement;
(h) Bribery;
(i) Gambling;
(j) Illegal kickbacks, including bribery to influence official or political actions
and receiving a bribe or bribery for endorsement of a person as a public servant;
(k) Extortionate extension, collection and financing of credit;
(1) Trafficking in controlled substances, explosives, weapons or stolen property;
(m) Aggravated arson or arson;
(n) Promoting prostitution;
(o) Obstructing or hindering criminal investigations or prosecutions;
(p) False statements or publications concerning land for sale or lease or sale
of subdivided lands or sale and mortgaging of unsubdivided lands;
(q) Resale of realty with intent to defraud;
(r) Sale of unregistered securities or real property securities or transactions
involving such securities by unregistered dealers or salesmen;
(s) A scheme or artifice to defraud;
(t) Perjury;
(u) Fraud in purchase or sale of securities;
(v) The soliciting, requesting, commanding, encouraging, or intentionally aiding
another in commission of any of the above enumerated offenses;
(w) Conspiracy to commit any of the above enumerated offenses; or
(x) An attempt to commit any of the above enumerated offenses.
(2) "Person" includes any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property.
(3) "Enterprise" means any individual, sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, business trust, association or other legal entity, and any union or group
of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity, and includes illicit as
well as licit entities.
(4) "Pattern of racketeering activity" means engaging in at least two episodes
of racketeering conduct which have the same or similar objectives, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or are otherwise interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events, provided at least one of such
episodes occurred after the effective date of this part and the last of which occurred
within five years after the commission of a prior episode of racketeering conduct.
History: C. 1953, 76-10-1602, enacted by
L. 1981, ch. 94, § 1.
76-10-1603. Unlawful acts — Felony — Forfeitures. (1) It shall be unlawful
for any person who has received any proceeds derived, whether directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity in which such person has participated, as a principal, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such
proceeds, or the proceeds derived from the investment or use thereof, in the acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise.
(2) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activii
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(3) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise to conduct or participate, whether directly or indirectly, in the conduct
of such enterprise's functions through a pattern of racketeering activity.
(4) It shall be unlawful for any person to attempt or to conspire to violate any
provision of subsections (1), (2), or (3) of this section, or to solicit, request, command, encourage, or intentionally aid another in the violation of any of the provisions of subsections (1), (2), or (3) of this section.
(5) Whoever violates any subsection of section 76-10-1603 shall be guilty of a
second degree felony and in addition to the penalties prescribed by law shall forfeit
to the state of Utah:
(a) any interest acquired or maintained in violation of section 76-10-1603; and
(b) any interest in, security of, claim against, or property or contractual right
of any kind affording a source of influence over any enterprise which he has established, operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in violation of section 76-10-1603 of this act.
(6) In any action brought by the state of Utah or, any county in the state under
this part, the district court shall have jurisdiction to enter such restraining orders
or prohibitions, and to take such other actions, including but not limited to, the
acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, in connection with any property or
other interest subject to forfeiture under this section, as it shall deem proper.
(7) Upon conviction of a person under this part, the court shall authorize the
attorney general or the county attorney to seize all property or other interest
declared forfeited under this section upon such terms and conditions as the court
shall deem proper. If a property right or other interest is not exercisable or transferable for value by the convicted person it shall expire, and shall not revert to
the convicted person.
History: C. 1953, 76-10-1603, enacted by
L. 1981, ch. 94, § 1.
76-10-1604. Enforcement authority of peace officers. Notwithstanding any
law to the contrary, peace officers in the state of Utah shall have authority to
enforce the criminal provisions of this act by initiating investigations, assisting
grand juries, obtaining indictments, filing informations, and assisting in the prosecution of criminal cases through the attorney general or county attorneys' offices.
History: C. 1953, 76-10-1604, enacted by
L. 1981, ch. 94, § 1.

76-10-1605. Remedies of person injured by pattern of racketeering activity
— Authorized orders of district court. (1) A person who sustains injury to his
person, business, or property by a pattern of racketeering activity, in which he is
not a participant, may file an action in the district court for the recovery of treble
damages, the costs of the suit, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any punitive damages the court may deem reasonable. The state or any county may file an
action on behalf of these persons injured or to prevent, restrain or remedy
racketeering as defined by this part.
(2) The district court has jurisdiction to prevent, restrain and remedy
racketeering as defined by this part after making provision for the rights of all
innocent persons affected by such violation and after hearing or trial, as appropriate, by issuing appropriate orders. The court shall determine issues by a preponderance of the evidence, and proceedings under this section shall be independent of
any other proceedings, whether civil or criminal, under the laws of this state.
^ (3) Prior to a determination of liability such orders may include, but are not
limited to, entering restraining orders or prohibitions or such other actions, includ-
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(4) Following a determination of liability such orders may include, but are not
limited to:
(a) Ordering any person to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in
any enterprise.
(b) Imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activities or investments of
any person, including prohibiting any person from engaging in the same type of
endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, the activities of which affect the laws of
Utah, to the extent the constitutions of the United States and Utah permit.
(c) Ordering dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise.
(d) Ordering the payment of treble damages to those persons who are not found
to be participants and are injured by the racketeering.
(e) Ordering the payment of all costs and expenses of the prosecution and investigation of any offenses included in the definition of racketeering, incurred by the
state, to be paid to the general fund of the state.
History: C. 1953, 76-10-1605, enacted by
L. 1981, ch. 94, § 1.
76-10-1606. Payments to general fund of state. The court may order payment
to the general fund of the state as appropriate, to the extent not already ordered
to be paid in other damages, of:
(1) Any interest acquired or maintained by a person in violation of section
76-10-1603.
(2) Any interest in, security of, claims against or property or contractual rights
of any kind affording a source of influence over any enterprise which a person has
established, operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in
violation of section 76-10-1603.
(3) An amount equal to the gain a person has acquired or maintained through
an oifense included in the definition of racketeering.
History: C. 1953, 76-10-1606, enacted by
L. 1981, ch. 94, § 1.
76-10-1607. Evidentiary value of criminal judgment in civil proceeding. A
final judgement or decree rendered in favor of the state or a county in any criminal
proceeding brought by this state or a county shall preclude the defendant from
denying the essential allegations of the criminal offense in any subsequent civil
proceeding.
History: C. 1953, 76-10-1607, enacted by
L. 1981, ch. 94, § 1.
76-10-1608. Separability clause. If any part of application of the Utah
Racketeering Influences and Criminal Enterprises Act is held invalid, the remainder of this part, or its application to other situations or persons, shall not be
affected.
History: C. 1953, 76-10-1608, enacted by
L. 1981, ch. 94, § 1.

Effective Date.
Section 2 of Laws 1981, ch. 94 provided:
"This act shall take effect July 1,1981."
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PART 17
CABLE TELEVISION PROGRAMMING DECENCY ACT
Section
76-10-1701 to 76-10-1708. Repealed.

76-10-1701 to 76-10-1708. Repealed.
Repeals. — Laws 1988, ch. 5, § 1 repeals
§§ 76-10-1701 to 76-10-1708, as enacted by
Laws 1983, ch. 207, §§ 1 to 8, entitled the Ca-

ble Television Programming Decency Act, effective April 25, 1988.

PART 18
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD
Section
76-10-1801.

Communications fraud.

76-10-1801. Communications fraud.
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another
or to obtain from another money, property, or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any
means for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice is
guilty of:
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or
thing obtained or sought to be obtained is $100 or less;
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or
thing obtained or sought to be obtained is more than $100 but does not
exceed $1,000;
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property, money, or
thing obtained or sought to be obtained is more than $1,000 but does not
exceed $10,000;
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or
thing obtained or sought to be obtained is more than $10,000 but does not
exceed $100,000;
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the scheme or artifice to
defraud is other than the obtaining of something of monetary value; and
(f) a first degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing
obtained or sought to be obtained is $100,000 or more.
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (1)
shall be measured by the total value of all property, money, or things obtained
or sought to be obtained by the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1)
except as provided in Subsection (l)(e).
(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary element of the
offense described in Subsection (1).

76-10-1801
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(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of executing or
concealing a scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) is a separate act
and offense of communication fraud.
(6) To communicate as described in Subsection (1) means to bestow, convey,
make known, recount, impart; to give by way of information; to talk over; or to
transmit information. Means of communication include, but are not limited
to, use of the mail, telephone, telegraph, radio, television, newspaper, computer, and spoken and written communication.
(7) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that the
pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted
by the defendant were not made or omitted knowingly or with a reckless
disregard for the truth.
History: C. 1953, 76-10-1801, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 157, § 2.
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Michael S. Eldredge (USB#0967)
Terry C. Turner (USB#3299)
Attorneys for Defendants
5295 South 320 West, Suite 540
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone 263-1511
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

MARIAN H. WEBB and JILL W.
BROWN,
Plaintiffs,
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSES
TO PLAINTIFFS1 REQUEST
FOR PRODUCTION OF
DOCUMENTS

vs.
VANTAGE INCOME PROPERTIES,
BRUCE HONEY, and STEVE
HOLCOMB,

Civil No. C-86-1302
Judge Timothy Hansen

Defendants.
* * * * * * *

COME NOW Defendants Holcomb and Vantage Income Properties, and
pursuant to the Order of the Court entered herein on October 5,
1987, supplement their responses to Plaintiffs1 Request for Production
of Documents as previously delivered to Plaintiffs on April 8, 1987.
Request No. l.

A copy of the document dissolving Vantage Income

Properties.
Response:
Request No, 2.

Said document was produced on April 8, 1987.
A copy of the Vantage Income Properties' Training

Manual for appraisers and salesmen.
Response:

Said document was erroneously indicated as having

been produced on April 8, 1987, however, Defendants have been
unable to locate such documents.

Defendants have no objection to

producing such documents and will continue their efforts to locate
such documents and produce them if and when they are available.

Request No. 3,

Names of all of Steve Holcomb's customers while he

was at Vantage Income Properties.
Response:

Such information does not exist on a single document,

however can be derived from the sales records of Vantage Income
Properties.

Defendants object to producing such information and/or

documents, and invoke their 5th amendment privilege against selfincrimination for the following reasons.

Plaintiffs have stated

repeatedly, in their oral arguments before this Court on April 8,
1987, in their Memorandum in Support of Striking Defendants1 Answer
on file herein, and in their oral argument before this Court on
October 5, 1987, that the expressed purpose of obtaining information
under this request is to discover information that will support
their claims under the First Cause of Action in the Complaint
herein against Defendants for alleged violations of the Utah Racketeering Influences and Criminal Enterprise Act ("RICE") specifically
enumerated in §§ 76-10-1602(p),(q) and (s).
The specific provisions allegedly violated by Defendants, as
set forth in the First Cause of Action in the Complaint herein,
constitute a second degree felony in the State of Utah.

§§ 76-

10-1602 and 76-10-1603 state that a "pattern of racketeering
activity" must be proved to establish liability.

Plaintiffs

further assert in their First, Second and Fourth Causes of Action
that Defendants have committed acts or omissions that would
constitute criminal violations of the Communications Fraud statute
found at § 76-10-1801 of the Criminal Code which would also
constitute a second degree felony.
-2-

Plaintiffs seek to support their allegations of racketeering
in the Complaint herein by "fishing" through the sales records and
customers of Steve Holcomb in an attempt to find anyone who might
join in Plaintiffs1 criminal allegations and thus establish a
"pattern of racketeering activity." This was expressly represented
by Paul Newton, counsel for Plaintiffs at the hearing on October
5, 1987, who stated substantially, or words to the effect, that
Plaintiffs wanted to find other customers who were no longer
"loyal" to Mr. Holcomb, and assist Plaintiffs in their efforts to
"get him off the streets."
If Defendants are required to produce such documents, and, if
Plaintiffs are successful in establishing sufficient evidence from
such records that Defendants have indeed violated provisions of
RICE and thus committed a second degree felony, then such violations
shall have been established through their own testimony, in direct
conflict with their expressed desire and constitutional privilege
not to provide any testimony that would tend to incriminate
themselves.

It is well established that Plaintiffs have a

burden of establishing such criminal liability on the face of
their complaint in order to obtain the treble damages they seek
as civil relief under §76-10-1605.

If Plaintiffs have carried

their burden, there is no need for further supportive discovery.
If they have not pleaded violations of RICE sufficient to establish
liability under RICE, which in this case is clear they have not,
then they cannot force Defendants, in violation of their 5th
amendment rights, to provide information that could be used in
-3-

any way to establish such liability and prove that Defendants had
indeed committed a second degree felony.
Plaintiffs assert that Defendant Holcomb has previously waived
his 5th amendment rights in testimony found on pages 48, 54, 59,
60, and 84-88 of Mr. Holcombfs deposition of December 4, 1986,
which deposition remains unpublished in this action.

Defendants

assert that Defendant Holcomb has made no representation whatsoever
on those pages, or at any other part of said deposition that he has
committed any act that can be construed as a criminal violation of
RICE or any other criminal statute that would constitute a waiver
of his 5th amendment rights, nor has he testified to any matter
therein that can only be verified or established by a review of the
sales records of Vantage Income Properties or customer lists of
Steve Holcomb.
Mr. Newton argued before the Court on October 5, 1987 that Mr.
Holcomb had testified that there were numerous times that he had
to take property back, implying to the Court that Mr. Holcomb had
committed alleged criminal acts.

As clearly stated on the pages

referred to by Plaintiffs1 counsel in the deposition, each decision
by Mr. Holcomb to take property back was based on a business judgment
that served the interests of all parties concerned, and in no
instance were the Defendants ever compelled to take back such
properties.
In summary, Defendants object to providing information in the
sales records or from Mr. Holcomb1s list of customers on the basis
that any information found by Plaintiffs in such records and lists
-4-

that could support their expressed goal of proving their allegations
of criminal violations by Defendants, and establish a pattern of
racketeering, or any other provision of the RICE or Communications
Fraud statutes, would accordingly be incriminating, and consequently
Defendants invoke their 5th amendment right not to testify in any
manner against themselves.

This objection is supported by Defendants1

Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs1 Motion to Strike Defendants'
Answer which was previously filed in this matter and argued before
the Court on October 5, 1987, which memorandum is incorporated
herein by reference.
Request No. 4.
Response:

The record for all sales at Vantage Income Properties.
Defendants incorporate their response to Request

No. 3 as if fully set forth herein.
Request No. 5.
Response:
Request No. 6.
Response:
Request No. 7.

A market analysis form of Vantage Income Properties.
Said document was produced on April 8, 1987.
A work-up sheet of Vantage Income Properties.
Said document was produced on April 8, 1987.
A sales training information sheet of Vantage

Income Properties.
Response:
Request No. 8.

Said document was produced on April 8, 1987.
A neighborhood survey prepared by Vantage Income

Properties.
Response:
Request No. 9.

Said document was produced on April 8, 1987.
A copy of the listing agreement between Vantage

Income Properties and Morris and Jo D'leen Nesmith.
Response:

Upon review of the records and documents of the
-5-

transactions between Nesmiths and Plaintiffs, Defendants have
been unable to locate a listing agreement between Nesmiths and
Vantage Income Properties,

Defendants believe that no such

agreement was ever entered into, and that Nesmiths negotiated
with Plaintiffs solely on the basis of the earnest money offer
presented by Plaintiffs, after Vantage Income Properties had
determined from Nesmiths that they were interested selling their
property if a suitable offer were made.

This practice is not

uncommon in the industry.
Request No. 10.
Response:

A copy of the 1986 tax return for Steve Holcomb.
Said document is expected to be available on or

about October 15, 1987 when Mr. Holcomb's extension for filing
will expire.

It will be forwarded to Plaintiffs immediately as

it becomes available.
DATED this

^r\
_day of \^C££(}&L

MICHAEL S. ELDREI
Co-counsel for Defendants
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Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Supplemental Responses to Plaintiffs1 Request
For Production of Documents to James L. Christensen, Esq. and
Paul D. Newton, Esq., counsel for Plaintiffs, at CORBRIDGE, BAIRD
?eet.
& CHRISTENSEN, 215 South State Street^
Suite 800, Salt Lake City,

Utah 84111, this

_day of

, 1987

l4/(lruaJc'
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EXl-SlI.V ' C ~

;

Michael S. Eldredge (USB#0976)
SNOW & HALLIDAY
Attorney for Appellants
261 East 300 South, Suite 350
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-4940

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MARION H. WEBB and JILL W.
BROWN,
Plaintiffs/Respondents,

Affidavit of Counsel
Case No 880137

vs.
VANTAGE INCOME PROPERTIES,
BRUCE HONEY, and STEVE
HOLCOMB,

Priority Classification
No, 14(b)

Defendants/Appellants.

STATE OF UTAH

)

ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
MICHAEL S. ELDREDGE, first duly sworn upon his oath, deposes
and states as follows:
1.

That he is counsel for Appellants in the above-captioned

matter;
2.

That the matters testified to herein are based upon his

own personal knowledge;
3.

That it was necessary to expend approximately 45 hours

to research issues, prepare motions, draft arguments and prepare
the Appelants f

Brief in this appeal as of the time of filing

of said brief;
4.

The affiant charges as legal fees for an appeal such as

this at $100 per hour, which rates are commensurate with rates
normally found for such legal services in Salt Lake City, Utah;
5. That Appellants have incurred approximately $4,500 in fees
in bringing this appeal;
That in the legal opinion of the Affiant, Appellants1

6.

incurring of such fees was necessary to preserve their constitutional
rights to privilege against self-incrimination;
7.

That Appellants are entitled to, and are in need of an

order from this Court awarding costs and attorney's fees incurred
as of the date of the decision in this appeal.
9.

Further, the affiar^t ^sayetl^naught.

DATED this £>

day of \ A A0W*~

, 1989

MICHAEL S.
Attorney for Appellant?
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

"Ula^aJ^

day of

, 1989.

(UJI+C

Q-Sty

NOTARY PUBLIC^
• "„
. yL y
R e s i d i n g a t : UcuSt4~ (XTLA^JL^,
lAJ&*~
My Commission E x p i r e s :
L/ir7/(£c,
Seal-
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